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Understanding Rising Income Inequality in Germany
* 
 
We examine the causes for rising income inequality in Europe’s most populous economy. 
From 2000 to 2006, Germany experienced an unprecedented rise in net equivalized income 
inequality and poverty. At the same time, unemployment rose to record levels and there was 
evidence for a widening distribution of labour market returns, as well as that of other market 
incomes. Other factors that possibly contributed to the rise in income inequality were 
changes in the tax system, changes in the household structure (in particular the rising share 
of single parent households), and changes in other socio-economic characteristics (e.g. age 
or education). We address the question of which factors were the main drivers of the 
observed inequality increase. Our results suggest that most of the increase can be explained 
by both changes in employment outcomes and in market returns, and, to a similar extent, by 
changes in the tax system. Changes in household structures and other household 
characteristics seem to have played a much smaller role. Put into an international 
perspective, our results suggest that rising income inequality in non-Anglo-Saxon countries is 
the likely result of both increasing inequality in market returns and increasing inequality in 
employment outcomes, as well as of idiosyncratic changes such as tax reforms. 
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(GSOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin. 1 Introduction
There has been a clear trend of increasing income inequality in industrialized countries over the
past three decades, although with diﬀerences in the timing and intensities across countries (see
OECD (2008)). This trend was ﬁrst observed in Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United States,
where pronounced changes in the wage and earnings distribution in the 1980s and 1990s sparked
a large body of literature examining the possible causes of increasing inequalities in labour market
returns (see e.g. Bound/Johnson (1992), Levy/Murnane (1992), Murphy/Welch (1992), Juhn
et al. (1993), and DiNardo et al. (1996)). The fact that many of these changes could not be
observed to the same extent in most of the less ﬂexible European labour markets, led Krugman
(1994) to formulate the hypothesis, that the dramatic increase in wage inequality in the United
States - which was generally seen as the result of skill-biased technological progress - and growing
unemployment in the less ﬂexible European labour markets, are ‘two sides of the same coin’.2
An interesting implication of Krugman’s hypothesis is that both rising wage inequality in Anglo-
Saxon countries and rising unemployment in continental European countries have similar eﬀects
on the distribution of overall personal incomes. Rising wage inequality directly translates into
rising inequality in personal incomes because wages are a major part of overall income, and rising
unemployment increases personal income inequality if the former wage incomes of the unemployed
are only imperfectly replaced by unemployment beneﬁts.
Germany is one of the countries whose wage and income distribution seemed remarkably stable
for a long time.3 While this view has recently been questioned for the distribution of wages,4
there is a consensus that the pronounced changes in the structure of wages that were observed
in other countries reached Germany with considerably delay. In Germany, wage inequality started
to grow in a clear way from the mid-1990s onwards, although the changes were less drastic than
those observed in countries such as the United States (see Kohn (2006), Genandt/Pfeiﬀer (2007),
Dustmann et al. (2009), Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2010), Antonczyk et al. (2010a, 2010b)). The
distribution of overall incomes remained quite stable until the end of the 1990s, but witnessed a
sharp increase in inequality and poverty beginning in 2000. This increase was accompanied by a
steep increase in unemployment which, along with the changes in the wage distribution, probably
2See e.g. Puhani (2008) for direct tests of the Krugman hypothesis.
3See Steiner/Wagner (1998), Biewen (2000), Prasad (2004). Strictly speaking, this applies only to West
Germany. The East German income distribution changed considerably following the reuniﬁcation of the country.
4See Dustmann et al. (2009).
1also contributed to the widening of the overall distribution of disposable personal incomes. Rising
unemployment and rising wage dispersion are not the only factors that may have been responsible
for the increase in overall inequality. Other factors include demographic changes, changes in living
arrangements, changes in characteristics such as age or educational qualiﬁcations, and changes
in the tax- and transfer system (see OECD (2008)).
While a large number of studies has focussed on such individual factors, surprisingly little is known
about the relative importance of the diﬀerent factors for the observed changes in the overall
distribution of incomes. Changes in the distribution of incomes have been well-documented for
many countries (see e.g. OECD (2008) and the references therein), but it is unclear which of
the many possible candidates are the main drivers of distributional change. This is all the more
surprising as the ﬁnal distribution of disposable incomes is what seems most interesting from a
policy point of view. For example, in view of the Krugman hypothesis, it seems highly relevant
to know whether rising income inequality in Germany is more the result of a widening wage
distribution, or the result of rising unemployment. This requires a comprehensive view of the
income distribution including its diﬀerent economic, social and institutional determinants such
as demographic aspects, employment outcomes, remuneration of market activities, taxes and
government transfers.5
In this paper, we provide a detailed examination of the main causes for rising income inequality
in Germany in a uniﬁed framework. Building on previous work by Hyslop/Mare (2005) for New
Zealand and Daly/Valetta (2006) for the United States, we use the semi-parametric kernel density
reweighting methodology originally developed by DiNardo et al. (1996) in order to decompose the
unprecedented increase in inequality and poverty in Germany from 2000 to 2006 into a number
of components. We consider in particular i) changes in the distribution of household types, ii)
changes in the distribution of socio-economic attributes such as age or educational qualiﬁcations,
iii) changes in employment outcomes conditional on such characteristics, iv) changes in market
returns to characteristics including changes in labour market returns, and v) changes in the tax
system. Our results complement previous studies on the German income distribution,6 which
documented some of the developments considered here, but which did not attempt to quantify
their relative importance for the overall development of the distribution. Our ﬁndings suggest
5Such a comprehensive view of the income distribution has also been adopted in a recent study by
Checchi/Garcia-Penalosa (2010).
6See e.g. Hauser/Becker (2003), Federal Government of Germany (2008), German Council of Economic
Experts (2009), and Grabka/Frick (2010).
2that roughly three quarters of the increase in inequality and poverty between 2000 and 2006 are
accounted for by rising unemployment, rising inequality in market returns, and by changes in the
tax system. Each of the three factors seems to have contributed a roughly equal share to the
overall increase. By contrast, changes in the distribution of household types, for example the
increasing share of single person and lone parent households, and other developments such as
changing educational qualiﬁcations and immigration seem to have played a minor role.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an informal discussion
of the increase in inequality and poverty in Germany between 2000 and 2006 and its possible
causes. In section 3, we describe our methodological setup. Section 4 discusses some data and
speciﬁcation issues. In section 5, we present our empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Possible sources of increasing inequality
In this section, we provide an informal discussion of the increase in inequality and poverty in
Germany over the period 2000 to 2006. This increase is shown in ﬁgures 1 and 2.7 Before the
year 2000, inequality in equivalized incomes remained remarkably stable (in the ﬁrst half of the
1990s), or was even slightly decreasing (in the second half of the 1990s), see e.g. Biewen (2000),
and Grabka/Frick (2010)).
— Figures 1 and 2 about here —
As measured by commonly used indices, inequality and poverty increased considerably between
2000 and 2006. For example, the ratio between the 90 percent and the 10 percent quantile
increased from roughly 3.3 in 2000 to 3.9 in 2006, while the Gini increased from .26 to .30.
Similarly, the percentage of individuals below the commonly used poverty line of 60 percent of
median equivalized income rose from 12 percent in 2000 to 16.5 percent in 2006. For sample size
reasons, we will pool in our analysis the years 1999/2000 and 2005/2006, which is well justiﬁed
given the roughly constant level of inequality and poverty in the years we pool. Also note that
7Our income concept is yearly equivalized post-government personal income, which is calculated as the sum
of income from all sources in a given household (including government transfers), net of taxes and social security
contributions. The resulting value is then divided by an equivalence scale and distributed equally among household
members. More details on the deﬁnition of our variables are given in section 4.
3the inequality increase took place during a period of stagnating mean income (see last graph of
ﬁgure 2).
What are possible candidates to explain this considerable increase in inequality and poverty? As
indicated above, the distribution of personal disposable incomes is the highly complex result of a
multitude of economic, institutional and social processes such as household formation processes,
employment outcomes, returns to employment and capital, private and public transfers, and taxes
and social security contributions. We focus on the following factors which appear to be the most
likely candidates to explain the observed inequality increase.
Rising unemployment
As ﬁgure 3 shows, the period 2000 to 2005 was one of steep unemployment growth. At the peak in
2005, there were almost 5 million registered unemployed in Germany. Increasing unemployment is
expected to increase inequality in disposable incomes because a growing fraction of the population
loses employment and therefore wage income. Unemployment beneﬁts are typically much lower
than previous wage income, and they decrease or cease to be paid as unemployment continues.
Given that the increase in unemployment over the period 2000 to 2005 was considerable, we expect
this increase to have large impact on income inequality. The contribution to the increase in overall
inequality will be the larger, the more unemployment growth is concentrated in the lower part
of the income distribution. This blends well with the hypothesis that skill-biased technological
progress especially aﬀects the employment prospects of low-skilled worker (see the discussion
above). Also note that during the period of the unemployment increase, overall employment was
stagnating (see ﬁgure 3).
— Figure 3 about here —
Increasing dispersion of market returns
A second possible source of increasing inequality is increasing inequality in market returns, espe-
cially labour market returns. This has been the focus of many previous studies. The common
perception is that the eﬀects of skill-biased technological progress, which is seen as the main
cause for the widening wage distribution in Anglo-Saxon countries since the 1980s,8 reached the
German labour market with a delay. In Germany, wage inequality started to grow in a clear way
8See e.g. Bound/Johnson (1992), Levy/Murnane (1992), Murphy/Welch (1992), Gosling et al. (2000).
4from the mid-1990s onwards, see Kohn (2006), Genandt/Pfeiﬀer (2007), Dustman et al. (2009),
Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2010), Antonczyk et al. (2010a, 2010b). The common perception is
that wage inequality increased both between and within skill groups, and that increases at the
top are well explained by skill-biased technical progress, while increases in the lower tail of the
distribution are better explained by additional factors such as deunionization and supply side
eﬀects (Dustman et al. (2009), Antonczyk et al. (2010b)).
Given the fact that labour market incomes are only one component of overall income and that they
are transformed by the tax and transfer system, it is unclear to what extent the observed widening
of labour market returns contributed to the increase in overall income inequality. Moreover, wage
income is not the only form of market income. Other forms of market income include income
from self-employment and capital income. We include these forms of income in our analysis by
considering market incomes from all possible sources. Increases in inequality in these sources may
also have contributed to the overall inequality increase over the period 2000 to 2006. For example,
there is evidence that wealth inequality increased over this period, implying that capital incomes
also grew more unequal (see German Council of Economic Experts (2009), and Frick/Grabka
(2009)).
Changes in the tax system
As in many other countries, the German tax schedule experienced several changes between 2000
and 2006. The main changes are summarized in table 1. Tax rates were generally reduced, but
reductions were somewhat higher at the top of the distribution. Given that some of the changes
were considerable, it seems likely that these changes had some impact on the ﬁnal distribution
of disposable income.
— Table 1 about here —
Changes in the household structure
There are clear trends in the way household structures change in industrialized countries.9 In
particular, there is a trend towards smaller households and towards untypical household forms
such as single parents. Given that incomes are pooled within households and given the fact that
diﬀerent household types systematically diﬀer in their average income, changes in the distribution
of household types may also have a potentially large eﬀect on the overall income distribution.
9See OECD (2008), ch. 2.
5— Figure 4 about here —
Figure 4 displays the evolution of population shares of a number of household types over the
period under consideration. The ﬁgure shows that the population shares of traditional household
forms such as couples with or without children are in decline, while the population shares of
single adult households, lone parents, and pensioner households are steadily increasing. However,
it also seems clear that population shares only change very gradually so that their eﬀects on
the distribution of income over a relatively short time span is probably limited when compared
to those of the more severe changes in unemployment and wage dispersion. The eﬀect of the
secular decline of household size on the income distribution in Germany was studied by Peichl
et al. (2010). Not explicitly considering other inﬂuences on the income distribution, they ﬁnd
that the eﬀect of declining household sizes is indeed limited, even over a period of 20 years.
Nevertheless, it seems necessary to account for such changes when studying the eﬀect of other
factors such as unemployment and market returns.
Changes in other socio-economic attributes
There are, apart from the household form, a number of other characteristics whose change over
time may have a potentially large inﬂuence on the income distribution. These are in partic-
ular changes in the age structure of the population (increasing share of the elderly, and the
decreasing shares of children and young persons), changes in educational qualiﬁcations (secular
skill-upgrading), and other changes in the composition of the population, e.g. due to immigra-
tion. We explicitly take account of these changes in our analysis by modeling and quantifying
this ‘characteristics’-eﬀect in our decompositions.
Other changes
We will capture distributional changes induced by factors other than the ones listed above in
the ‘residual’ of our decomposition analysis. It turns out that the unexplained ‘residual’ of our
analysis is relatively small so that the factors listed above successfully account for most of the
inequality increase from 2000 to 2006. What may be the such other factors? A factor which may
also have a potentially large impact on the distribution of net incomes are changes in Germany’s
highly complex system of government transfers. Due to the high complexity of these transfers,10
we refrain from explicitly modeling changes in these transfers. This seems unproblematic as there
10They include transfers for children, students, mothers, the disabled, the unemployed, housing allowances,
general social assistance, to name only the most important ones.
6were only minor changes in these transfers over the period 2000 to 2005.11 The fact that the
residual component of our decomposition is relatively small conﬁrms our conjecture that changes
in the transfer system had only a small eﬀect on the development of the income distribution over
the years 2000 to 2006.
3 Estimation of counterfactual income densities
Following DiNardo et al. (1996) and Hyslop/Mare (2005),12 we use a semiparametric decompo-
sition technique to decompose the inequality increase from 1999/2000 (‘period 0’) to 2005/2006
(‘period 1’) into diﬀerent components that are attributable to the factors listed above. The basic
idea of this decomposition technique is that of a shift-share analysis, in which observations are
reweighted according to whether they are over- or underrepresented in a counterfactual situation.
Counterfactual situations are obtained by holding some aspects of interest ﬁxed at the period 0
level, while changing others to the period 1 level. The method has its limitations in that it can-
not account for interactions between the diﬀerent factors in the form of behavioural reactions or
general equilibrium eﬀects. Nevertheless, it is generally believed that counterfactual reweighting
and simulation exercises convey important information about the main drivers of distributional
changes.13
Stage 1: Changes in the distribution of household types
As a ﬁrst stage we consider the eﬀect of shifts in the composition of the population with respect
to a number of household types (we distinguish between the six household types mentioned above,
see ﬁgure 4). The counterfactual income distribution in which everything is as in period 0, but
the distribution of household types is shifted to that of period 1 is given by




11However, a major reform, the so-called ‘Hartz-Reform’ was enacted in 2005. Due to several transitional rules,
the full eﬀects of the ‘Hartz-Reform’ on the income distribution are probably measurable only after 2006. Due
to the high complexity of the changes and due to reasons of data availability for the years after 2006 (new data
become available with a considerable delay because incomes are asked retrospectively for the previous year) along
with the need to pool years, we defer an analysis of these changes to future research.
12For a similar application, see Daly/Valetta (2006).
13See Fortin et al. (2010).
7where y denotes net equivalized personal income, w1j is the population share of household type
j in period 1, and f0j(y) the income distribution of individuals from household type j in period
0. Analogously, f0(y|th = 0) would be the factual income distribution in period 0, where w1j is
replaced by the factual population shares w0j.
Stages 2 and 3: Changes in socio-economic attributes and employment outcomes
The second and third stages of our decompositions account for changes in the distribution of
socio-economic attributes x (e.g. the age and educational composition of the household, see
below for more details) and changes in household employment outcomes e conditional on these
attributes x. For example, the counterfactual income density for individuals living in household
type j in which everything is as in period 0 but the distribution of socio-economic attributes x and
the distribution of household employment outcomes e conditional on socio-economic attributes
are as in period 1, is given by



























Ψe|x,j · Ψx|j · f0j(y|x,e) dF0j(e|x) dF0j(x). (4)
Note that the counterfactual distribution f0j(y|tx = 1,te = 1) is just a reweighted version of
the factual distribution fj0(y) with reweighting factors Ψe|x,j and Ψx|j. The factual distribution
fj0(y) can be obtained by setting Ψe|x,j = Ψx|j = 1. Analogously, f0j(y|tx = 1,te = 0) with
Ψe|x,j = 1 is the counterfactual distribution where only the distribution of characteristics x is
shifted to that of period 1 (while the conditional employment and everything else is held ﬁxed at
its period 0 level). Finally, f0j(y|tx = 0,te = 1) with Ψx|j = 1 would be the distribution where
only conditional employment outcomes are changed to the period 1 level, but everything else is
held ﬁxed at the period 0 level.


















Equation (6) nicely illustrates how the reweighting procedure works. For example, if a par-
ticular household employment outcome e for an observation with household characteristics x
8is less likely in period 1 compared to period 0, this observation will be down-weighted in pe-
riod 0 when constructing the counterfactual density. Following Hyslop/Mare (2005), we de-
ﬁne household employment outcomes e as an ordinal variable (for details, see below), so that
reweighting factor Ψe|x,j can be estimated using predictions from ordinal logit models P1j(e|x)
and P0j(e|x). Analogously, reweighting factor Ψx|j can be estimated using predictions from logit
models Pj(t = 1|x),Pj(t = 0|x) and the ratio of observational mass in period 0 and period 1.
Stage 4: Changes in market returns and changes in tax system
In stages 4 and 5 of our decomposition we consider changes in market returns to household
characteristics z = (e,x) and changes in the tax schedule. Counterfactual income y
cf
0 in period
0 accounting for the expected change b ∆ygross = z0
′ˆ β1j − z0
′ˆ β0j in gross market income due to
changes in the returns to household characteristics ∆ˆ βj = ˆ β1j − ˆ β0j and for changes in the tax
schedule is given by
y
cf
0 = ygross,0 + b ∆ygross + ytransf,0 − ysscontr,0 − tax1(ygross,0 + b ∆ygross) (7)
where ygross,0 denotes period 0 market incomes from all sources, ytransf,0,ysscontr,0 period 0
government transfers and social security contributions, and tax1(·) the tax schedule of period 1.
The counterfactual income that results if only the tax schedule is changed to that of period 1 but
market returns to household characteristics are ﬁxed at the period 0 level is obtained by setting
b ∆ygross = 0.
In a similar way, the counterfactual income that results if only market returns are changed to the
period 1 levels but the tax schedule is held ﬁxed at its period 0 level is given by
y
cf
0 = ygross,0 + b ∆ygross + ytransf,0 − ysscontr,0 − tax0(ygross,0 + b ∆ygross). (8)
In short-hand notation, the changes to income in period 0 due to counterfactual variations of
market returns and the tax schedule can be expressed as
y
cf
0 = ynet,0 + b ∆ygross − b ∆t, (9)
where ynet,0 is the factual net income of period 0.
Counterfactual densities incorporating stages 1 to 5
Combining equations (1) through (9) one can deﬁne counterfactual income densities that combine
any desired set of counterfactual variations. For example, the overall income distribution in period
90 that results if household structures, employment outcomes, and market returns are ﬁxed at
their period 0 levels but the distribution of socio-economic attributes and the tax schedule are
counterfactually set to their period 1 levels, is given by
f0(y|th = 0,tx = 1,te = 0,tr = 0,tt = 1) = f0(y|0,1,0,0,1). (10)














where θi denotes the sample weight of individual i, nj is the number of individuals in household
type j, K(.) a kernel function, h a bandwidth, and Ψj = w1j/w0j. If a particular counterfactual
variation is not desired, the corresponding weighting factor Ψj,Ψx|j,Ψe|x,j is set to 1, or the
corresponding shift factor b ∆ygross, b ∆t is set to zero, respectively.
Estimation of inequality and poverty indices
Given an estimated income density ˆ f(y), we use numerical integration methods to calculate the
inequality and poverty indices shown in table 2.14
— Table 2 about here —
4 Data and speciﬁcation issues
We base our analysis on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1999
to 2006. As indicated above we pool the years 1999/2000 (‘period 0’) and 2005/2006 (‘period
1’) in order to increase sample sizes and to make our analysis less dependent on particular years.
The total sample sizes are 45,085 individuals for period 0 and 50,427 individuals for period 1.
Our data refers to individuals (including children). All our calculations are weighted with the
appropriate sample weights.15 Our main income variable is real annual equivalized personal net
income which is calculated from annual net household income. Annual net household income is
given by
net income = gross income + transfers − social security contributions − taxes. (12)
14For the deﬁnition and properties of these indices, see Cowell (2000)
15We do not use the so-called ‘high-income sample’ G because the validity of its sample weights is questionable.
10Our data set comprises all of the listed components of net income. Taxes were calculated by
the data provider, the DIW Berlin, using the oﬃcial rules.16 In order to compute the individual
income of the members of a given household, household net income is divided by the sum
of equivalence weights deﬁned by the so-called OECD equivalence scale (the household head
receives a weight of 1, additional household members over 14 years receive a weight of .5,
household aged 14 years or less receive a weight of .3). In a robustness analysis, we consider
two alternative equivalence scales to see whether our results depend on this particular choice
(see below). Following recommendations and practice of the Statistical Oﬃce of the European
Commission, we set the poverty line to 60 percent of the median of equivalized personal incomes
in a given year. Note that our deﬁnitions are the same as the ones used in the oﬃcial ‘Report on
Poverty and Richness’ published by the federal government.17
As indicated above, we deﬁne six diﬀerent household types: i) single pensioner households (65
years or older), ii) multiple pensioner households (at least one household member is 65 years
or older and no household member is under 55), iii) single adults without children, iv) multiple
adults without children, v) single adults with children, and vi) multiple adults with children. As
socio-economic household attributes x we consider the number of adults in the household, the
fraction of female adults in the household, the fraction of adult household members with diﬀerent
educational qualiﬁcations (university degree, high school and/or vocational training, no such
degree or qualiﬁcation), the fraction of adult household members with non-German nationality,
the fraction of adult household members with disabilities, the fraction of married adults in the
household, the fraction of household members in diﬀerent age groups (0-3 years, 4-11 years,
12-17 years, 18-30 years, 31-50 years, 51-64 years, 65 or older), and a dummy indicating whether
the household resided in East Germany (see table 6 in the appendix for details).
Employment outcomes e are deﬁned in an ordinal way: i) no part-time or full-time workers in
the household, ii) no full-time workers but at least one part-time worker, iii) one full-time worker
but no part-time workers iv) one full-time worker and at least one part-time worker, v) at least
two full-time workers. We estimate the probability for each household employment outcome e
conditional on socio-economic attributes x using ordinal logit models. All estimations are carried
out for each household type separately (see table 7 in the appendix for details). In order to
estimate gross market returns, we regress gross household income from all sources on socio-
16See Grabka (2009) for more details on the deﬁnition of the diﬀerent income variables.
17See Federal Government of Germany (2008). The only diﬀerence is that we do not consider imputed rental
values as income.
11economic attributes, employment outcome categories, and a full set of interactions. We drop
regressors that are grossly insigniﬁcant in both periods. Again, all regressions are carried out
separately for each household type (see table 8 in the appendix for details).
The tax schedule is estimated using a ﬂexible polynomial in household gross income along with
suitable interactions with variables such as marital status or children (i.e. we regress the household
tax variable as given in the data on a polynomial in gross income and interactions with other
characteristics). Our regressions ﬁt the tax values given in the data extremely well, making us
conﬁdent that we use the correct tax schedule. The regressions are only carried out for nonzero tax
values. A household pays no tax if its gross income is below the sum of personal tax exemptions.
When calculating counterfactual tax values, we ﬁrst check whether this is the case. We then
calculate positive tax values using the estimated tax schedule only if household gross income
exceeds the sum of personal tax exemptions and impute a value of zero otherwise.
Note that our analysis refers to inequality in net income between individuals (not households).
All data are individual data but individuals are attributed the characteristics and the (equivalized)
incomes of the households they live in. Incomes are expressed in year 2000 Euros (except for tax
calculations which require nominal incomes). For expositional reasons we consider log equivalized
incomes, which we appropriately transform back when calculating the inequality and poverty
indices in table 2.
5 Empirical results
This section presents our empirical results. The decomposition of the overall distribution into
the diﬀerent components representing the population subgroups described by household types
is illustrated in ﬁgure 5 (note that all ﬁgures show distributions of logged incomes). It clearly
emerges that multiple adult households with or without children represent by far the largest
portion of the overall distribution, while single person households and pensioner households play
a smaller role. The contribution of single parents households is particularly small, which is due
to their relatively small population share (see ﬁgure 4). One can also see that the incomes of
individuals in multiple adult households are mostly located in the upper part of the distribution,
while those of individuals in multiple adult households with children and pensioner households are
mostly located in the middle and the lower parts of the overall distribution.
125.1 Overall change in density from 1999/2000 to 2005/2006
Figure 6 shows how the overall shape of the (log) income distribution changed from 1999/2000
(‘period 0’) to 2005/2006 (‘period 1’). The picture that emerges is one of increasing spread,
i.e. the distribution in 2005/2006 has a lower peak and fatter tails than the one in 1999/2000.
However, the widening of the distribution is not symmetric, the changes seem particularly pro-
nounced in the lower tail of the distribution, implying that low incomes were particularly aﬀected
by increasing inequality.
5.2 ‘Ceteris paribus’ eﬀects of individual factors
Next, we consider ‘ceteris paribus’ eﬀects of the diﬀerent factors, i.e. we change only one factor
at a time to its period 1 level, but hold everything else ﬁxed at the level of the base period 0.
We believe that such an exercise comes close to what one has in mind when asking about the
‘eﬀect’ of a particular factor on the overall change. For example, the dashed line in ﬁgure 7 shows
the income distribution that would prevail if the distribution of household types was changed to
that of period 1, but everything else was held ﬁxed at its period 0 level. The ﬁgure shows that
changes in household structures alone did not contribute much to the change in the distribution
between 1999/2000 to 2005/2006 (there was a slight shift of mass from the middle to the lower
part of the distribution, but this eﬀect was rather small).
In a similar way, ﬁgure 8 conﬁrms that changing only the distribution of socio-economic attributes
to its period 1 level but leaving everything else as in period 0, did not have any perceivable eﬀect
on the overall distribution. By contrast, ﬁgure 9 shows the eﬀect of changing only conditional
employment outcomes but leaving everything else constant. This considerably stretches the
lower and middle part of the distribution to the left, suggesting that changes in unemployment
and part-time employment aﬀected in particular individuals in the middle and lower part of the
distribution. High income households appeared to be largely unaﬀected by such changes. Figure
10 shows the eﬀect of a ceteris paribus change in market returns. This also has a considerable
eﬀect. The distribution is shifted to the right, but more so for middle and higher incomes (i.e.
middle and high income households beneﬁted more from changes in the market remuneration
of household characteristics). Finally, ﬁgure 11 presents the ceteris paribus eﬀect of changes
in the tax schedule. These also shifted the distribution to the right, but much more so for
middle and especially for high incomes. This suggests that middle and high incomes beneﬁted
13overproportionally from reduced tax rates, while the density in the very low end of the distribution
remained practically constant (these households usually do not pay any tax at all).
The analysis of such ceteris paribus changes by household type reveals interesting additional
patterns. For example, ﬁgure 12 shows the eﬀects of a ceteris paribus change in conditional
employment outcomes by household type. Obviously, individuals in pensioner households are only
marginally aﬀected by such changes (there is generally very little employment in these house-
holds), see top row of ﬁgure 12. The household types most aﬀected by changes in employment
probabilities are single adult households and multiple adult households with children. By contrast,
multiple adult households without children were practically unaﬀected by changes in conditional
employment prospects. Single parents household were also hit unfavourably by changing employ-
ment probabilities, presumably in connection with changes in part-time work. Figure 13 presents
the results for a ceteris paribus change in market returns. The most interesting feature of this
ﬁgure is that changes in market returns did not only aﬀect household types with a close attach-
ment to the labour market but also pensioner households whose market income is composed of
interest, dividend and rent income rather than of wage income. This suggests that increasing
inequality in gross incomes was not only the result of a widening wage distribution, but also the
result of a widening distribution of capital income. All other household types were hit in a similar
way by a distributional shift of the middle and upper part to the right. For these household types,
changes in returns on the labour market were probably more relevant than changes in returns
to capital. Finally, ﬁgure 14 displays the eﬀects of a ceteris paribus change in the tax schedule.
Pensioner households were only aﬀected by such changes in the upper part of the distribution
as most ordinary lower pensions were completely exempt from taxation during the period under
consideration. The results for the other household types indicate that in particular the well-oﬀ
multiple adult households without children beneﬁted from the reductions in tax rates between
2000 and 2005.
Going back to the overall distribution, table 3 summarizes what percentage of the overall increase
in inequality as measured by various inequality and poverty indices can be explained by changing
one factor at a time. The numbers largely conﬁrm the ﬁndings from the graphical analysis. Only
a small percentage of the overall inequality increase can be explained by isolated changes in the
distribution of household types (around 7 percent on average) or by changes in socio-economic
attributes (around 5 percent on average). Changes in conditional employment outcomes explain
on average 26 percent of the total increase (column 3), changes in market returns on average
24 percent (column 4), and changes in the tax system on average 26 percent (column 5). The
14general conclusion is that changes in employment outcomes, changes in market returns, and
changes in the tax schedule explain the inequality increase in equal parts, while changes in
household structures and socio-economic attributes play only a minor role. It is also interesting
to look at individual contributions in diﬀerent parts of the distribution. For example, changes in
conditional employment outcomes contribute to an especially large extent to the increase in the
poverty head count FGT(0) and the poverty gap measure FGT(1), while changes in market
returns and changes in the tax schedule contribute more strongly to the increase of indices that
measure inequality at the top of the distribution (see p9050).
A drawback of the ceteris paribus analysis presented so far is that the percentages contributed
by each factor do not add up to the complete change. In the next section, we therefore present
an exact decomposition whose contributions add up, and which also allows one to assess the
importance of residual factors.
5.3 Exact decomposition of the increase in inequality and poverty
We proceed in the usual fashion,18 and decompose the inequality increase 1999/2000 to
2005/2006 into a sequence of incremental changes that result when changes of the individ-
ual factors are accumulated. Using this idea, the change in inequality between 1999/2000 and




















































































is decomposed into parts contributed by changes in the household struc-
ture (13), changes in socio-economic characteristics (14), changes in conditional employment
18See e.g. DiNardo et al. (1996) and Hyslop/Mare (2005).
15outcomes (15), changes in market returns (16), changes in the tax schedule (17), and an unex-
plained residual (18).
Table 4 shows the contributions of each of the factors as a percentage of the overall inequality
increase. For example, some 5.31 percent of the increase of the Gini coeﬃcient from 1999/2000 to
2005/2006 are attributable to changes in household structures. The results largely reproduce the
ﬁndings from the ceteris paribus analysis. Changes in household structures and socio-economic
attributes contribute relatively little (around 7 and 5 percent on average), whereas changes in
employment outcomes explain some 25 percent, changes in market returns 27 percent, and
changes in the tax schedule around 21 percent of the overall inequality increase on average. The
unexplained residual amounts to 20 percent on average, implying that most of the inequality
increase is successfully accounted for by the factors considered above.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
Decomposition (13) to (17) contains an element of arbitrariness in that the order in which the
diﬀerent factors are cumulated could also have been diﬀerent (e.g. one could have started
with changing conditional employment outcomes instead changing the distribution of household
types).19 In order to assess how sensitive our decomposition results are with respect to the
order chosen, we carried out the decomposition in all possible 5! = 120 orders. The results
of this exercise are shown in table 5 in the appendix. It turns out that the contributions of
the diﬀerent factors are reasonably stable when the order of the decomposition is changed.
Moreover, we believe that the sequential order used in (13) to (17) is more reasonable than
many of the other possible orderings for two reasons. First, in decomposition (13) to (17)
factors are basically changed in the order of their ‘pre-determinedness’, i.e. household type
and socio-economic attributes are chosen before employment outcomes, market incomes are the
result of household characteristics and employment outcomes, and taxes are both the result of
market incomes and household characteristics. Second, the order used in (13) to (17) essentially
reproduces the contributions that result from the ceteris paribus analysis, which is appealing on
a-priori grounds, but which has the disadvantage of non-additivity.
We also carried out further sensitivity checks, in particular we varied the bandwidth used in our
19Biewen (2001) illustrates the problems of possible path dependencies in sequential decompositions such as
the one considered here.
16density estimations and the equivalence scale used to make incomes comparable across household
types. A combination of graphical inspection and Silverman’s rule of thumb led us to use a ﬁxed
bandwidth of .175 throughout our analysis.20 Our numerical results change only little if we vary
the bandwidth between .1 and .3, and qualitative results remain unchanged. The same applies if
we use two alternative equivalence scales (we used the so-called Luxembourg scale which deﬂates
household incomes by the square root of household size, and another scale which assigns a weight
of 1 to the household head, and weights of .7 and .5 to additional household members over 14
years, and up to 14 years, respectively).
6 Conclusion
This paper addressed the question of which factors were behind the recent increase in personal
income inequality in Germany. Using a variant of DiNardo et al. (1996)’s semi-parametric
reweighting methodology, we decompose the increase in income inequality and poverty from
1999/2000 to 2005/2006 into components explained by i) changes in the distribution of household
types, ii) changes in the distribution of socio-economic characteristics, iii) changes in employment
probabilities conditional on characteristics, iv) changes in market returns to characteristics, and
v) changes in the tax system. Our results suggest that most of the inequality increase can be
explained by both changes in employment outcomes and in market returns, and, to a similar
extent, by changes in the tax system. Changes in household structures and other household
characteristics seem to have played a much smaller role. Put into an international perspective,
our results suggest that rising income inequality in non-Anglo-Saxon countries is the likely result
of both increasing inequality in market returns and increasing inequality in employment outcomes,
as well as of idiosyncratic changes such as tax reforms.
20Hyslop/Mare (2005) use a similar ﬁxed bandwidth.
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Figure 7 – Counterfactual income distribution if only the distribution of household types is changed
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24Figure 8 – Counterfactual income distribution if only the distribution of socio-economic attributes
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Counterfactual density S2 1 in 0
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Figure 9 – Counterfactual income distribution if only conditional employment outcomes are changed











5 6 7 8 9
Log equivalent HH−income with OECD(1,0.5,0.3) real year 2000
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Counterfactual density S3 1 in 0
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25Figure 10 – Counterfactual income distribution if only market returns are changed (dashed line) vs.
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Counterfactual density S4 1 in 0
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Figure 11 – Counterfactual income distribution if only the tax schedule is changed (dashed line)
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Counterfactual density S5 1 in 0
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26Figure 12 – Counterfactual income distribution if only conditional employment outcomes are
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Source: GSOEP, own calculations
27Figure 13 – Counterfactual income distribution if only market returns are changed (dashed line) vs.
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28Figure 14 – Counterfactual income distribution if only the tax schedule is changed (dashed line) vs.
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Table 1 – Changes in the German tax schedule
Year Basic Min. Marginal End of Prog- Max. Marginal
Allowance Tax Rate ression Zone Tax Rate
1999 6,681 EUR 23.9% 61,376 EUR 53%
2000 6,902 EUR 22.9% 58,643 EUR 51%
2001 7,206 EUR 19.9% 54,998 EUR 48.5%
2002/2003 7,235 EUR 19.9% 55,008 EUR 48.8%
2004 7,664 EUR 16.0% 52,152 EUR 45%
2005/2006 7,664 EUR 15.0% 52,152 EUR 42%
Source: German Federal Ministry of Finance
Table 2 – Inequality and poverty indices
Index Abbr. Estimator
Quantile ratio 90/10 p9010 d p9010( ˆ f) = ˆ q90/ˆ q10
Quantile ratio 90/50 p9050 d p9050( ˆ f) = ˆ q90/ˆ q50
Quantile ratio 75/25 p7525 d p5010( ˆ f) = ˆ q75/ˆ q25
Quantile ratio 50/10 p5010 d p5010( ˆ f) = ˆ q50/ˆ q10
Coeﬃcient of variance CV b cv( ˆ f) = sd( ˆ f)/µ( ˆ f)
Theil’s measure Theil d theil( ˆ f) =
R y














Gini coeﬃcient Gini d gini( ˆ f) =
R
y(2 ˆ F(y) − 1) ˆ f(y) dy







ˆ f(y)dy, α ≥ 0
Note: FGT(0) = poverty headcount, FGT(1) = poverty gap measure, p( ˆ f) = poverty line
30Table 3 – Ceteris paribus eﬀects as percentage of overall inequality increase
Percentage of the overall inequality increase explained by ceteris paribus change of
Household Socio-economic Employment Return on Tax system
Structure attributes outcomes attributes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
p5010 7.39 (2.82) 4.42 (3.26) 36.09 (9.10) 17.84 (11.70) 22.37 (5.81)
p7525 6.80 (2.29) 3.39 (2.78) 24.02 (5.14) 13.65 (9.15) 27.50 (6.26)
p9010 8.93 (2.45) 6.93 (2.92) 34.54 (7.23) 23.12 (9.54) 25.18 (6.06)
p9050 13.47 (4.92) 13.47 (7.26) 33.87 (13.21) 37.28 (21.22) 33.87 (20.36)
Cv 8.20 (2.21) 5.22 (2.88) 19.28 (4.14) 20.76 (6.99) 26.02 (5.98)
Theil 8.33 (2.24) 6.54 (2.79) 22.99 (4.50) 27.51 (8.56) 24.21 (5.51)
Mld 3.90 (2.23) 3.82 (2.96) 23.03 (5.53) 21.56 (9.98) 26.52 (5.30)
Gini 5.31 (2.44) 3.33 (3.08) 22.95 (5.27) 13.93 (9.52) 28.24 (5.59)
Fgt0 7.72 (2.58) 4.19 (2.76) 31.58 (6.87) 20.83 (10.67) 21.25 (5.28)
Fgt1 4.03 (2.54) 7.33 (3.81) 35.14 (9.11) 30.96 (13.93) 21.80 (5.88)
Source: GSOEP, own calculations. The numbers in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors which correctly
take into account the longitudinal sample design and the clustering of individuals in households.
Table 4 – Exact decomposition of inequality increase
Results of sequential decomposition attributable to
Household Socio-economic Employment Return on Tax system Residual
Structure attributes outcomes attributes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
p5010 7.39 (2.82) 5.96 (3.26) 30.48 (8.76) 23.62 (16.49) 24.30 (5.64) 8.25
p7525 6.80 (2.29) 3.42 (2.79) 22.54 (5.33) 14.15 (10.66) 19.08 (3.22) 33.30
p9010 8.93 (2.45) 6.04 (2.96) 30.16 (7.11) 29.61 (13.03) 20.59 (3.77) 4.67
p9050 13.47 (4.92) 6.77 (7.24) 30.80 (12.70) 41.89 (24.98) 10.62 (8.59) -3.55
Cv 8.20 (2.21) 4.66 (3.04) 16.96 (4.19) 22.76 (7.80) 20.92 (5.24) 26.50
Theil 8.33 (2.24) 5.07 (2.70) 19.92 (4.54) 31.41 (9.80) 19.88 (4.66) 15.36
Mld 3.90 (2.23) 5.81 (2.70) 23.30 (5.43) 28.85 (12.1) 19.64 (4.65) 18.47
Gini 5.31 (2.44) 5.54 (2.79) 23.17 (4.99) 17.71 (10.91) 17.77 (4.71) 30.48
Fgt0 7.72 (2.58) 5.34 (2.73) 26.67 (6.64) 20.23 (12.34) 19.81 (3.97) 20.24
Fgt1 4.03 (2.54) 8.21 (3.79) 30.40 (9.07) 39.38 (17.19) 23.09 (5.01) -5.11
Source: GSOEP, own calculations. The numbers in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors which correctly
take into account the longitudinal sample design and the clustering of individuals in households.
3110 Appendix
Table 5 – Results from all 120 possible sequential decompositions
Marginal relative change attributable to
Household Socio-economic Employment Return on Tax system
Structure attributes outcomes attributes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
c5010 (Total Change = .231)
Primary order 7.39 5.96 30.48 23.62 24.30
Mean 4.57 8.16 37.08 20.11 23.37
Sd 2.57 2.50 2.91 2.37 1.26
Min 1.61 4.54 31.64 15.67 21.37
Max 7.77 11.62 43.90 23.98 25.60
c7525 (Total Change = .200)
Primary order 6.80 3.42 22.54 14.15 19.80
Mean 6.27 4.51 24.00 9.12 22.79
Sd 1.18 0.88 1.25 5.12 5.21
Min 3.48 3.42 20.70 1.80 15.69
Max 7.25 5.44 26.65 15.93 30.14
c9010 (Total Change = .623)
Primary order 8.93 6.04 30.16 29.61 20.59
Mean 6.61 9.09 35.61 21.12 22.90
Sd 2.02 1.94 2.64 3.91 3.93
Min 4.21 6.04 29.82 13.80 16.69
Max 9.47 12.15 41.27 29.61 30.50
c9050 (Total Change = .101)
Primary order 13.47 6.77 30.80 41.89 10.62
Mean 11.02 11.02 32.47 23.44 22.06
Sd 2.31 2.32 3.39 12.99 12.59
Min 3.31 3.31 26.31 9.93 6.63
Max 13.51 13.51 36.91 41.89 40.45
CV (Total Change = .085)
Primary order 8.20 4.66 16.96 22.76 20.92
Mean 7.13 5.34 19.07 18.53 23.44
Sd 0.89 0.66 0.83 2.82 2.82
Min 5.43 4.07 16.96 14.36 19.81
Max 8.54 6.23 20.40 23.70 27.25
Theil (Total Change = .035)
Primary order 8.33 5.07 19.93 31.42 19.89
Mean 6.60 6.45 23.58 26.15 21.86
Sd 1.21 0.79 1.77 2.77 2.63
Min 4.73 4.95 19.93 21.42 18.13
Max 8.33 7.55 26.87 32.07 26.08
Mld (Total Change = .034)
Primary order 3.90 5.82 23.31 28.86 19.64
Mean 4.62 7.02 26.10 19.80 23.99
Sd 1.09 1.87 2.27 5.16 5.18
32Min 3.49 3.82 23.03 12.64 17.86
Max 6.85 9.01 30.29 29.14 32.15
Gini (Total Change = .035)
Primary order 5.32 5.54 23.17 17.72 17.77
Mean 6.21 6.25 24.03 9.07 23.96
Sd 0.96 1.67 1.07 6.77 6.60
Min 5.11 3.33 22.95 1.14 16.69
Max 8.47 8.06 26.57 18.28 33.05
Fgt0 (Total Change = .043)
Primary order 7.72 5.34 26.67 20.23 19.81
Mean 5.44 6.22 28.78 20.40 20.41
Sd 1.92 2.21 1.85 2.12 0.99
Min 2.03 2.69 25.13 15.95 18.54
Max 7.87 9.35 32.56 24.63 21.92
Fgt1 (Total Change = .138)
Primary order 4.03 8.21 30.40 39.38 23.09
Mean 1.49 9.42 38.05 35.23 22.55
Sd 2.56 1.85 4.51 4.04 0.93
Min -2.38 6.99 30.40 29.94 20.09
Max 4.44 13.00 46.49 40.94 24.23
Source: GSOEP, own calculations
33Table 6 – Variable names
hhemp household employment outcome
(0 = ‘no ft/no pt’, 1 = ‘no ft/at least 1 pt’,
2 = ‘1 ft/no pt’, 3 = ‘1 ft/at least 1 pt’,
4 = ‘at least 2 ft’)
hhemp_d0-hhemp_d4 household employment category dummies
hhadult number of adults in the household
f_ad_fem fraction of adult hh-members female
f_ad_for fraction of adult hh-members foreigner
f_ad_mar fraction of adult hh-members married
f_ad_uni fraction of adult hh-members with university degree
f_ad_abv fraction of adult hh-members with high school degree
and/or vocational training
f_ad_dis fraction of adult hh-members with disabilities
f_ad_03 fraction of hh-members aged 0-3 years
f_ad_11 fraction of hh-members aged 4-11 years
f_ad_17 fraction of hh-members aged 12-17 years
f_ad_30 fraction of hh-members aged 18-30 years
f_ad_50 fraction of hh-members aged 31-50 years
f_ad_65 fraction of hh-members aged 51-65 years
f_ad_99 fraction of hh-members aged 65 years or older
e East Germany
34Table 7 – Ordinal logit models
Household Type 2 Household Type 3 Household Type 4 Household Type 5 Household Type 6
Variable 1999/2000 2005/2006 1999/2000 2005/2006 1999/2000 2005/2006 1999/2000 2005/2006 1999/2000 2005/2006
number of adults 1.875 1.745 .420 .499 1.063 1.329
(.317) (.355) (.070) (.083) (.110) (.125)
f_ad_fem -.159 -.550 -1.136 -.660 -2.183 -1.410
(.140) (.142) (.296) (.322) (.538) (.776)
f_ad_age50 1.079 1.037 .567 .771 -.711 .999 .756 .759
(.171) (.185) (.177) (.211) (.385) (.485) (.183) (.266)
f_ad_age64 -.533 -.168 -1.586 -.773 -2.589 .579 -.349 -.586
(.173) (.179) (.191) (.200) (1.433) (.728) (.364) (.410)
f_ad_age99 -2.629 -3.736 -3.515 -2.377
(.563) (.616) (.448) (.344)
f_ad_uni 1.268 1.040 1.153 1.794 2.068 2.053 1.969 1.814 1.523 2.426
(.387) (.340) (.250) (.260) (.198) (.233) (.404) (.523) (.246) (.274)
f_ad_abv .560 .818 1.435 1.785 .349 .955 1.428 2.014
(.196) (.211) (.151) (.175) (.302) (.349) (.204) (.249)
f_ad_dis -.900 -.992 -1.003 -.687 -1.042 -1.177 -1.067 -1.546
(.485) (.423) (.224) (.210) (.183) (.217) (.404) (.366)
f_ad_mar .411 .476 .094 .278 -.472 -.123 .858 .882
(.274) (.245) (.137) (.143) (.286) (.312) (.231) (.277)
f_ad_for -.312 -.962 .571 -.034 1.368 .797 -.146 -.415
(.336) (.354) (.205) (.231) (.564) (.546) (.212) (.219)
f_ch_11 2.523 2.326 .447 .931
(.728) (.946) (.155) (.161)
f_ch_17 3.639 2.731 1.292 1.123
(.756) (.976) (.154) (.167)
e -0.810 -0.697 -.864 -.688 -.231 -.397 -.086 -.664 .489 .395
(.288) (.261) (.146) (.152) (.093) (.103) (.295) (.349) (.127) (.167)
/cut1 2.439 2.179 -.367 .086 -1.014 .078 .940 2.685 2.374 4.104
/cut2 2.931 2.682 -.080 .389 -.558 .612 .938 3.951 2.978 4.755
/cut3 1.138 2.348 5.973 7.426
/cut4 1.819 3.158 7.352 9.084
Pseudo R2 0.167 0.170 0.123 0.119 0.113 0.086 0.181 0.115 0.086 0.103
Number of clusters 1349 1700 2127 2122 3744 3350 422 447 3471 2716
Source: GSOEP, own calculations. Standard errors account for clustering of observations in households.
3
5Table 8 – Regression of market incomes on household characteristics (# denotes interaction eﬀects)
Household Type 1
Variable 1999/2000 2005/2006
hhemp_d1 2.410 (0.478) 2.268 (0.239)
hhemp_d2 1.960 (0.481) 2.250 (0.400)
f_ad_fem 0.234 (0.232) -0.089 (0.189)
f_ad_abv 0.716 (0.187) 0.515 (0.167)
f_ad_uni 1.617 (0.378) 1.333 (0.300)
e -1.135 (0.217) -1.310 (0.173)
_cons 3.291 (0.271) 3.872 (0.205)
R2 0.131 0.147
Number of clusters 1339 1868
Household Type 2
Variable 1999/2000 2005/2006
hhemp_d1 2.133 (0.199) 1.202 (0.191)
hhemp_d2 2.866 (0.162) 2.287 (0.151)
hhemp_d3 3.074 (0.206) 2.873 (0.276)
hhemp_d4 3.790 (0.222) 2.524 (0.273)
hhadult 0.315 (0.215) 0.026 (0.174)
f_ad_fem 0.232 (0.834) -0.082 (0.664)
f_ad_for 0.228 (0.423) 0.143 (0.320)
f_ad_mar 0.633 (0.369) -0.216 (0.409)
f_ad_age99 -0.187 (0.329) -1.116 (0.299)
f_ad_uni 1.491 (0.295) 1.858 (0.280)
f_ad_abv 0.239 (0.235) 0.619 (0.250)
f_ad_dis 0.336 (0.210) 0.248 (0.210)
e -1.305 (0.156) -1.531 (0.159)
_cons 2.751 (0.998) 5.213 (0.895)
R2 0.286 0.295
Number of clusters 1264 1622
Household Type 3
Variable 1999/2000 2005/2006
hhemp_d1 -0.326 (0.363) 0.750 (0.366)
hhemp_d2 1.000 (0.248) 2.104 (0.299)
f_ad_fem -0.551 (0.198) 0.192 (0.196)
f_ad_for -0.558 (0.505) 1.048 (0.289)
f_ad_age50 -1.307 (0.369) -0.744 (0.273)
f_ad_age64 -1.266 (0.216) -1.286 (0.256)
f_ad_uni 0.478 (0.397) 1.058 (0.342)
f_ad_abv -0.023 (0.243) 0.578 (0.271)
f_ad_dis -0.938 (0.224) -0.500 (0.264)
e -0.508 (0.197) -0.563 (0.198)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_fem
1 0.505 (0.219) 0.049 (0.273)
2 0.464 (0.198) -0.313 (0.198)
hhemp#
36c.f_ad_for
1 0.129 (0.537) -1.851 (0.402)
2 0.433 (0.515) -0.997 (0.298)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_age50
1 1.841 (0.383) 1.155 (0.312)
2 1.511 (0.367) 0.906 (0.272)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_age64
1 1.792 (0.256) 1.628 (0.298)
2 1.498 (0.222) 1.539 (0.262)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_uni
1 0.634 (0.486) 0.004 (0.394)
2 -0.051 (0.404) -0.593 (0.355)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_abv
1 0.617 (0.372) -0.162 (0.333)
2 0.176 (0.255) -0.415 (0.282)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_dis
1 0.667 (0.290) 0.786 (0.342)
2 0.897 (0.235) 0.557 (0.271)
hhemp#c.e
1 0.196 (0.240) 0.154 (0.290)
2 0.137 (0.203) 0.182 (0.202)
_cons 6.519 (0.232) 5.427 (0.290)
R2 0.609 0.572
Number of clusters 2002 1980
Household Type 4
Variable 1999/2000 2005/2006
hhemp_d1 0.123 (0.887) 0.167 (0.643)
hhemp_d2 0.061 (0.749) 0.308 (0.596)
hhemp_d3 0.293 (0.759) 0.658 (0.596)
hhemp_d4 0.601 (0.746) 0.754 (0.583)
f_ad_age50 -1.529 (0.509) -1.395 (0.452)
f_ad_age64 -2.306 (0.401) -0.829 (0.316)
f_ad_age99 -3.387 (0.829) -1.211 (0.766)
f_ad_uni 1.990 (0.343) 1.166 (0.440)
e -1.268 (0.212) -0.858 (0.197)
hhemp#
c.hhadult
0 -0.194 (0.242) -0.173 (0.134)
1 -0.160 (0.108) -0.215 (0.074)
2 -0.082 (0.033) -0.137 (0.039)
3 -0.107 (0.038) -0.141 (0.031)
4 -0.124 (0.023) -0.144 (0.025)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_fem
0 -0.229 (0.570) -0.610 (0.682)
371 -0.737 (0.631) -0.036 (0.293)
2 -0.029 (0.149) -0.090 (0.155)
3 0.021 (0.180) 0.127 (0.183)
4 -0.051 (0.122) 0.077 (0.187)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_for
0 -1.245 (0.495) -1.041 (0.570)
1 -0.157 (0.168) -0.577 (0.365)
2 -0.233 (0.087) -0.202 (0.112)
3 -0.459 (0.180) -0.416 (0.287)
4 -0.216 (0.069) -0.183 (0.090)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_mar
0 -0.195 (0.330) -0.206 (0.276)
1 0.164 (0.161) 0.202 (0.189)
2 -0.059 (0.115) 0.134 (0.076)
3 0.080 (0.060) 0.238 (0.106)
4 0.015 (0.039) 0.043 (0.049)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_age50
1 1.431 (0.606) 1.237 (0.511)
2 1.719 (0.522) 1.597 (0.459)
3 1.710 (0.520) 1.410 (0.471)
4 1.699 (0.512) 1.703 (0.455)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_age64
1 1.892 (0.478) 0.602 (0.407)
2 2.493 (0.417) 1.129 (0.332)
3 2.480 (0.414) 0.890 (0.344)
4 2.435 (0.405) 1.102 (0.323)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_age99
1 2.557 (1.055) 0.986 (0.862)
2 2.371 (0.985) 0.727 (0.804)
3 3.054 (0.858) 0.348 (0.960)
4 2.817 (0.904) 0.849 (0.844)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_uni
1 -0.952 (0.378) -0.211 (0.468)
2 -1.285 (0.347) -0.636 (0.456)
3 -1.480 (0.353) -0.660 (0.449)
4 -1.540 (0.346) -0.658 (0.444)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_dis
0 0.233 (0.338) -1.081 (0.320)
1 -0.054 (0.200) -0.229 (0.254)
2 -0.422 (0.209) 0.016 (0.105)
3 -0.047 (0.139) 0.196 (0.167)
4 -0.010 (0.111) 0.211 (0.093)
hhemp#c.e
1 0.968 (0.262) 0.513 (0.237)
382 0.814 (0.216) 0.417 (0.209)
3 0.864 (0.218) 0.535 (0.205)
4 0.968 (0.214) 0.647 (0.203)
_cons 7.525 (0.738) 7.171 (0.571)
R2 0.613 0.535
Number of clusters 3659 3247
Household Type 5
Variable 1999/2000 2005/2006
hhemp_d1 1.009 (0.696) 1.005 (0.654)
hhemp_d2 1.676 (0.524) 2.426 (0.658)
f_ad_age50 0.083 (0.381) -0.063 (0.486)
f_ad_age64 -1.634 (1.816) -1.071 (1.150)
f_ad_uni -1.401 (0.638) 0.117 (0.459)
f_ad_dis 0.391 (0.347) -0.681 (0.286)
f_ch_age11 -0.581 (0.595) 1.168 (0.830)
f_ch_age17 0.515 (0.432) 0.549 (0.902)
e -0.191 (0.347) -0.740 (0.565)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_age50
1 0.458 (0.494) 0.777 (0.563)
2 0.140 (0.415) 0.222 (0.553)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_age64
1 2.735 (1.854) 1.730 (1.224)
2 2.483 (1.849) 1.132 (1.209)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_uni
1 1.043 (0.793) 0.384 (0.494)
2 1.912 (0.651) 0.436 (0.482)
hhemp#
c.f_ch_age11
1 0.568 (0.701) -0.673 (0.870)
2 0.843 (0.613) -0.933 (0.892)
hhemp#
c.f_ch_age17
1 -0.685 (0.582) -0.128 (0.935)
2 -0.556 (0.472) -0.404 (0.960)
hhemp#c.e
1 0.411 (0.406) 0.753 (0.597)
2 -0.191 (0.373) 0.244 (0.587)
_cons 5.295 (0.510) 4.610 (0.571)
R2 0.449 0.427
Number of clusters 387 407
Household Type 6
Variable 1999/2000 2005/2006
hhemp_d1 0.553 (1.283) 1.694 (1.690)
hhemp_d2 0.782 (1.165) 3.296 (1.451)
hhemp_d3 0.848 (1.132) 4.106 (1.490)
39hhemp_d4 1.144 (1.120) 4.941 (1.444)
hhadult -0.008 (0.325) 0.233 (0.254)
f_ad_fem -2.396 (1.107) 1.099 (1.916)
f_ad_for -0.098 (0.430) -1.097 (0.472)
f_ad_mar -0.032 (0.431) -0.029 (0.379)
f_ad_age50 -0.056 (0.336) 0.228 (0.398)
f_ad_age64 -1.831 (0.795) -0.435 (0.738)
f_ad_uni -0.284 (1.000) 1.316 (0.668)
f_ad_abv 0.340 (0.453) 0.593 (0.367)
f_ch_age11 -0.083 (0.420) 0.066 (0.407)
f_ch_age17 0.286 (0.479) 0.425 (0.442)
e -0.352 (0.035) -0.301 (0.053)
hhemp#
c.hhadult
1 -0.149 (0.364) -0.019 (0.289)
2 -0.111 (0.331) -0.176 (0.259)
3 -0.034 (0.327) -0.258 (0.275)
4 -0.124 (0.326) -0.475 (0.258)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_fem
1 1.601 (1.186) -0.557 (1.967)
2 1.985 (1.166) -1.505 (1.937)
3 2.473 (1.125) -1.815 (1.942)
4 2.249 (1.117) -1.488 (1.942)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_for
1 0.161 (0.512) 0.492 (0.477)
2 0.009 (0.436) 0.856 (0.482)
3 -0.166 (0.436) 0.450 (0.516)
4 0.057 (0.434) 1.141 (0.485)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_mar
1 -0.875 (0.484) 0.025 (0.476)
2 0.000 (0.450) 0.235 (0.401)
3 0.050 (0.437) 0.032 (0.394)
4 -0.026 (0.436) 0.130 (0.398)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_age50
1 0.344 (0.438) 0.178 (0.591)
2 0.295 (0.347) 0.085 (0.414)
3 0.137 (0.349) 0.250 (0.420)
4 0.221 (0.347) -0.386 (0.430)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_age64
1 1.976 (0.869) 1.002 (0.836)
2 1.980 (0.810) 1.059 (0.771)
3 2.064 (0.807) 1.011 (0.759)
4 1.998 (0.809) 0.213 (0.766)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_uni
1 1.701 (1.070) 0.114 (0.705)
402 1.119 (1.005) -0.595 (0.683)
3 1.049 (1.006) -0.518 (0.695)
4 0.908 (1.006) -0.625 (0.685)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_abv
1 0.445 (0.520) 0.211 (0.458)
2 -0.061 (0.461) -0.299 (0.387)
3 -0.107 (0.461) -0.429 (0.414)
4 -0.145 (0.460) -0.458 (0.389)
hhemp#
c.f_ad_dis
0 -0.971 (0.483) -0.769 (0.772)
1 -0.735 (0.353) 0.451 (0.274)
2 -0.061 (0.104) 0.019 (0.144)
3 -0.239 (0.098) -0.149 (0.154)
4 -0.132 (0.133) -0.312 (0.233)
hhemp#
c.f_ch_age11
1 0.364 (0.472) -0.281 (0.503)
2 0.088 (0.434) -0.021 (0.412)
3 -0.049 (0.429) -0.171 (0.413)
4 0.149 (0.431) -0.018 (0.421)
hhemp#
c.f_ch_age17
1 0.094 (0.516) -0.602 (0.515
2 -0.304 (0.490) -0.472 (0.458)
3 -0.310 (0.487) -0.463 (0.447)
4 -0.121 (0.490) -0.324 (0.455)
_cons 6.514 (1.111) 3.323 (1.416)
R2 0.446 0.564
Number of clusters 3442 2676
Standard errors account for clustering of observations in households.
Source: GSOEP, own calculations.
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